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The Federal Government and U.S. industry are embarking on the largest and 
most intensive effort ever undertaken to increase the production of synfuels, 
including oil an-d gas from coal, peat, tar sands, and oil shale. This effort 
consists of two major parts: an interim program and a long range program. 
The interim program was conducted by the Department of Energy's (DOE) 
Alternative Fuels Production Program, and a joint DOE-Department of Defense 
(DOD) program which allowed funding for syr.fuels projects under amendments to 
the Defense Production Act. Under the interim program which has since been 
terminated, three projects -- the Union Oil shale proje.ct, the TOSCO portion 
of the Colony shale project, and the Great plains coal gasification project 
-- received Federal assistance to proceed with large scale development. 
The long range program is being conducted by the United States Synthetic 
Fuels Corporation (SFC), an independent Federal entity which is functioning 
primarily as an investmen.t bank to accelerate the commercialization of 
synfuels. To date, SFC has issued three general solicitations requesting 
project sponsors to submit proposals for financial assistance. More than 90 
groups responded with proposals of widely varying quality. The Corporation 
rejected most of these proposals because they failed to meet its criteria for 
denonstrating project strength and maturity. However, SFC judged several 
projects worthy of support and issued letters of funding intent to two groups 
of sponsors that intend to convert tar sands into liquid fuels and to process 
peat into methanol. The Corporation has also issued one "targetedf1 
solicitation restricted to western oil shale projects and plan's to issue at 
least one for coal-based synfuels projects. 
P.L. 96-294 directs SFC to help achieve the National Synfuels Production 
Goals of reaching a daily synfuels production capacity of . 5  million barrels 
of sil equivalent by 1987 and 2.0 .million barrels by 1992. Although SFC is 
seeking to implement efficiently Title I of the Energy Security Act, it is 
unlikely that the Corporation will be able to carry out effectively many of 
the goals and objectives of this law. In fact, if an average daily Synfuels 
prcduction level of 30,000 to 60,000 barrels of oil equivalent is reached by 
1987, industry and SFC wo.uld have achieved a major technological and economic 
accomplishment. 
Congress and the Administration can choose from a variety of options 
regarding the future of the SFC, including: (1) abolish the Corporation, (2) 
extend S F C f s  authority to include the support of biomass fuels projects and 
energy-from-solid-waste plants, and (3) provide additional appropriations 
beyond the $14.9 billion now available to the Corporation. The Reagan 
Administration has stated that it does not intend to provide any additional 
appropriations to the SFC. 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
UNITED STATES SYNTHETIC FUELS CORPORATION 
Title I of the Energy Security Act creates an independent, Federal entity 
called the United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC), which is 
authorized to provide several forms of financial assistance to foster the 
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production of synfuels. SFC-supported p r o ~ e c t s  wlll be deslgned to convert 
tne K a t ~ o n ' s  coal, oil shale, tar sands, peat, and c e r t a ~ n  heavy oil 
resources i ~ t o  synfuels whlck czc be used as s u b s ~ ~ t u t e s  for natural qas Z R ~  
s e t r c l e - x  (~rcluding crzde o ~ l ,  ~ e t r o i e ~ r c  p r ~ d u c t s ,  an2 chemlcal feedstocks). 
The s a c  also 1s authorized to a s s ~ s t  faclllt1es used solely: (1) to produce 
mlxtures of coal and petroleum for dlrect fuel use, (2) for commerc~al 
production of hydrogen from water, and (3) for the commercial production of 
electricity by a magnetohydrodynamlc (MHD) topplng cycle. 
Financial Resources of the Corporation 
The financial resources available to SFC over its 12-year lifetime are 
limited to a maximum of $88 billion. Congressional appropriations to finance 
S F C v s  operations are deposited in the Energy Security Reserve of the U.S. 
Treasury (whi'ch was established by the Department of the Interior and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1980, P.L. 96-126). The first installment of 
funding for the SFC, $20 billion, is authorized as of June 30, 1980, subject 
to appropriations. The second and subsequent installments will be authorized 
(up to a maximum of $68 billion) by joint congressional resolutions, subject 
to appropriations. 
In P.L. 96-304 Congress stated that up to about $17.5 billion of the 
Energy Security Reserve would be available to the SFC. Of these funds, $6 
billion was made immediately available to cover the commitments and expenses 
of the Corporation; an additional $6.2 billion was made available for such 
purposes after June 30, 1982; and the remaining $5.3 billion was to be 
derived from funds appropriated to DOE for the interim program under the 
amendments to the Defense Production Act and the Kon-Nuclear Act -- to the 
extent that such funds were not committed or ccnditionally committed by the 
DOE. In February 1982, President Reagan transferred to SFC approximately 
$2.7 billion that DOE did not use cnder the interim program. Thus, by June 
30, 1982, SFC had a total of about $14.9 Sillion of appropriated funds. 
The SFC's authority to make new awards or commitments will end after Sept. 
30, 1992, and SFC must terminate its affairs by Sept. 30, 1997. Upon 
termination, SFC's outstanding contracts for financial assistance will be 
transferred to the Secretary of the Treasury for administration. 
Administrative Structure and Expenses of the Corporation 
SFC's powers are vested in a seven-member Board of Directors, composed of 
a chairman and six other directors, to be appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate. The chairman, who is responsible. for S F C v s  
management and direction, will be appointed for a 7-year term and must serve 
on a full-time basis. The other six Directors may serve on a part-time 
basis. The Board, by majority vote, appoints S F C v s  officers (including a 
General Counsel and a Treasurer), defines their duties, and fixes their 
salaries. In addition, the Board sets all major policies, determines 
guidelines and criteria for soliciting and evaluating proposals, and makes 
final judgments on the award of financial assistance to projects. Up to 300 
full-time professionals may work for SFC at any one time. 
Through FY82, SFC spent $18.6 million on its administrative operations, 
including generic studies to support program and policy activities. SFC 
expects its administrative expenses to amount to $23.6 million in FY83, and 
$26.9 m'illion in FY84, versus authorized levels of $54.1 million and $56.7 
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million in FY83 and FY84, respectively. Proposed FY84 increases in the SFC's 
administrative budget are incended to support additionai staffing to handle 
~ r o j e c t  evaluation, negotiaticc, seiection, and monitoring responsibilities 
acd z c  develop the comprehensive strategy required 3y the Energy Security 
Act. (See section below for additional information on SFC's comprehensive 
strategy . )  
President Reagan-appointed and the Senate confirmed Edward Noble to be 
Chairman of the SFC. In September 1981 four of the six members of the Board 
were confirmed by the Senate. They were Victor Thompson, Robert Monks, 
Victor Schroeder, and Howard Wilkins. In August 1982, the last two members 
of the Board, John Carter and Milton Masson, were confirmed by the Senate, 
giving SFC's Board for the first time its full complement of seven members. 
SFC7s Goals and Comprehensive Strategy 
In P.L. 96-294, Congress established a national goal of achieving a 
synthetic fuels production capability equivalent to at least 500,000 barrels 
of crude oil per day by 1987, increasing to at least 2 million barrels per 
day by 1992. Unless a one year-extension is requested, SFC is required by 
June 30, 1984, to develop and submit to Congress a comprehensive strategy for 
achieving these production goals. The comprehensive strategy will include 
reports on economic, technological, and environmental aspects of synfuels 
projects granted financial incentives up to that date, and will also presect 
S F C 7 s  longer-term objectives and its schedule to achieve them. The plan will 
emphasize private sector responsibilities and will describe how specific 
limitations will be placed on SFC's involvement. After consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense, SFC must consider the feasibility of meeting national 
defense fuel requirements using synfuels produced by SFC-assisted projects. 
P.L. 96-294 specifies that Congress must consider SFC's comprehensive 
strategy for approval by joint' resolution. SFC cannot be liable for more 
than $20 billion until the comprehensive strategy is approved and funds 
appropriated. 
In February 1982 SFC's Board concluded that the national synfuels 
production goals would be difficult to meet. Accordingly, the Board decided 
to support a diversity of.projects, instead of funding projects that would 
provide only near-term production. This decision is consistent with the 
provisions of P.L. 96-294 that emphasize the sponsoring of technological 
diversity of projects prior to submission of SFC's comprehensive strategy. 
By pursuing this strategy, SFC's ~ o a r d  suggested that a larger scale synfuels 
production could be achieved over the long-term, because the private sector 
could duplicate the various technologies that proved successful. 
In July 1982, SFC's Board concluded that its diversity goal could be 
accomplished by supporting the commercialization of relatively few 
combinations of synfuels resources and technologies, especially those that 
offer the greatest potential for large-scale production. To implement this 
decision, SFC's Board estimated that the following maximum amounts of 
financial assistance would be necessary to accomplish the desired 
technological diversity under its first three solicitations: $6 billion to 
support coal-b.ased projects, $3 billion for oil shale projects, and $1 
billion for tar sands and heavy oil projects. The balance of SFC's 
obligational authority will be available to meet either diversity or 
production objectives, or to fulfill other goals of Title I of P.L. 96-294. 
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Mechanisms of SFZ's Financial Assistance 
T5e S X  ray ~ r o v l d e  flnanclal asslszance to the prlvate sector fcr 
synfuels p r o ~ e c t s  ~n the foliowlng order of decreasing pr~orities: 
1) purchase agreements, price guarantees, and loan guarantees; 
2) loans; and 
3) joint ventures for project modules. (This last type of 
assistance may b"e granted only prior to approval of SFC's 
comprehensive strategy.) 
Before awarding loans or participating in joint ventures, SFC's Board must 
determine that purchase agreements, price guarantees, and loan guarantees 
will not adequately support the construction and operation of a synfuels 
project or will restrict its available participants. The SFC's Board will 
give preference to proposals which would likely result in the least 
commitment of financial assistance by the Corporation and the lowest unit 
production cost within a given technological process. 
In deciding which synfuels projects to support, SFC must also consider the 
range of available technologies, the overall production potential of each 
technology, and the potential of each technology for compliance with 
environmental regulations. According to P.L. 96-294, if the synfuels 
products of a proposed project would be sold or transported at regulated 
rates, SFC may consider when awarding financial incentives whether the 
ratemaking decisions are likely to protect the financial interests of the 
investors and SFC. 
Whenever judged practicable by SFC's Board, SFC is directed to award 
financial assistance on the basis of competitive bids. If SFC solicits bids 
for a synfuels project and none are received, or if those received are 
unacceptable to SFC's Board, the Board can negotiate a financial assistance 
contract for a specific project after reporting to the appropriate House and 
Senate authorities. 
The Board may decide to grant more than one form of financial assistance 
to a single project only if multiple assistance forms are required to achieve 
economic feasibility, and if the project is necessary to satisfy national 
synfuels program goals. Investors who are granted more than one type of 
incentive must bear "a reasonable degree of risk" -- but those solely in the 
position of being a lender are not required to bear such risks. 
A maximum of 15% of S F C t s  financial assistance budget may be awarded to 
each single company o r  person. Once SFC awards a company some form of 
financial incentive, SFC may have access "at all reasonable times" to 
whatever company records are needed to insure compliance with the terms of 
financial assistance provided by SFC. 
SFC is authorized to require appropriate security and collateral for the 
repayment of any obligations owed to it. All forms of financial assistance 
granted b y  SFC shall be general obligations of the United States backed by 
its full faith and credit. 
A recipient of SFC's financial assistance must develop a plan to monitor a 
project's environmental and health-related emissions. The plan must be 
acceptable to SFC's Board of Directors and it must be developed in 
consultation with the Administrator of the EPA, the Secretary of Energy, and 
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appropriate State agencies. 
L!r,der c e r t a ~ n  limited circumstances., S F C  cocld acquire control of o r  
pcrchase ane leaseSack synfuels projects, subject to congressio~al review and 
veto. Such control would have to be disposed of within 5 years after 
acquisition. 
When the Secretary of the Treasury transfers requested funds to SFC, 
obligations and outlays incurred will be included in the U.S. budget. 
However, since SFC is an independent entity, its receipts and disbursement 
will not be included in U.S. budget totals, although these financial 
transactions will be made public in the budget report. Thus, transactions 
between SFC and the Secretary of the Treasury will be on-budget items, while 
the transactions between SFC and recipients will be off-budget items. 
S F C t s  Solicitation Process and Activities 
The SFC has organized its solicitation activities into three phases. 
Under Phase I SFC will select synthetic fuels proposals that have best 
responded to a solicitation and are most likely to advance the purposes of 
the Energy Security Act. SFC assesses whether a proposed project is mature 
and has a reasonable prospect of receiving financial assistance from the 
Corporation under its solicitation criteria. Phase I1 will involve further 
project assessmer!t, proposal refinement, verification of industry data and 
plans, and negotiation of appropriate financial assistance. Phase I11 will 
include monitoring plant construction and eventual synfuels production. To 
assist and oversee projects, the SFC has devised a "project matrix system," 
which consists of integrated project teams assigned from all relevant offices 
of the SFC. Each team will help guide a project through SFC's solicitation 
process and will negotiate with the project sponsors the details of financial 
assistance and methods of project oversight. 
To date, SFC has issued three general solicitations requesting project 
sponsors to submit proposals for financial assistance. More than 90 
industrial groups submitted proposals of widely varying quality in four 
resource categories: oil shale, coal or peat, tar sands or heavy oils, and 
hydrogen from water by electrolysis. After a detailed review, SFC rejected 
most of these proposals because they failed to meet its criteria for project 
strength and maturity. However, the Corporation judged several projects 
worthy of support and conducted negotiations with their spon.sors over the 
terms of possible financial assistance. 
As a result of these negotiations, SFC signed a letter of funding intent 
in December 1982 with the sponsors of the "First Colonyu project which will 
be designed to produce 4,800 barrels per day of methanol from peat. Provided 
that final agreements can be reached, the Corporation intends to provide up 
to $465 million in loan guarantees and price guarantees to this project, 
which is scheduled to be completed by Dec. 31, 1985, near Creswell, North 
Carolina. 
In addition, SFC signed a letter of funding intent with the sponsors of a 
project that will be designed to produce 4,000 barrels of tar sands oil per 
day near Santa Rosa, New ~ e x i c o .  Pending that final agreement, the 
Corporation intends to provide a loan guarantee of up to $20 million and an 
initial price guarantee of up to $21 million. 
SFC officials are also currently negotiating the final details of a letter 
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of funding intent with sponsors of a heavy oil refining project proposed for 
West 3izzsbur9, Cadifornia. This p.roject will Se designee to process  he 
2qxivalent cf 5 , 0 5 0  barrels c.f oil per day. 
S?CTs Board of Directors also has approved a competitive solicitation for 
western oil shale projects capable of producing at least 10,000 barrels per 
day of oil equivalent. SFC intends to issue one or more solicitations 
restricted to coal-based synfuels pr0ject.s. 
SFC As Part of the Nation's Synfuels Production Program 
The Federal Government and U.S. industry are jointly embarking on the 
largest and most intensive program ever undertaken to increase the domestic 
production of synfuels. The Federal Government will play a key and 
determining role in both promoting and' regulating this emerging industry. 
The SFC, which is a Federal entity as defined by law, will be concerned 
primarily with providing economic incentives to stimulate commercialization. 
However, SFC will also consider other factors that will influence 
production. For example, SFC officials have stated that they must deal with 
a number of external constraints, including water and other resource 
availability, material and equipment capacity, skiiled labor availability, 
socboeconomic development capacity, and the limited number of potential 
project sponsors able to bear the risks of synfuels commercialization. SFC 
has also held meetings with various organizations that will influence their 
program. These groups include Federal regulatory agencies, DOE, Department 
of Treasury, and environmental and public interest groups. Thus, the SFC can 
be viewed as one of many participants in the Nation's synfuels 
commercialization efforts. 
An Assessment of S F C 1 s  Progress and Possible Accomplishments 
SFC's program can be assessed in terms of two criteria: efficiency, a 
measure of the cost required t-o accomplish a task; and effectiveness, a 
measure of accomplishments in terms of stated goals and objectives. 
There is much evidence that SFC wants to carry out its responsibilities 
and impleaent its program efficiently. Chairman Noble has repeatedly stated 
that SFC will use its financial incentives to expedite the growth of a 
synfuels industry at the least cost to the taxpayer and with minimum 
Government involvement. In selecting which projects to assist, the 
Corporation seeks spcnsors that exhibit strong management capability and that 
are willlng to back financially a major portion of their own projects. 
~urthermore, SFC wants to fund only economically sound and environmentally 
safe synfuels plants. SFC has deliberately taken its time in defining its 
objectives, establishing its procedures and policies, and in seeking to hire 
the best staff available. By proceeding cautiously, SFC hopes to avoid 
making costly mistakes. In order to choose the strongest and maturest 
projects, SFC has developed and is now using a rigorous and carefully 
designed selection process. 
Under Chairman Noble's guidance, SFC also has' taken many administrative 
actions designed to improve its organizational efficiency. The Corporation 
has revised its salary structure to be more acceptable to Congress and to 
allow the Corporation to compete better with the private sector for qualified 
personnel. However, so.me Members are concerned that salaries of two of SFC's 
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senlor offlclals are st111 too h ~ g h ,  e.g., those ln the $50,003 to $100,000 
range. Over the iast two years, S F C  has funct-one3 wlth apprcxlmately 70 to 
123 professional staff, fewer than the  rnaxlinum number allowed under the - s:.erqp Security Act (30C). in aCd;t~oc, S F C  haas realigned ~ t s  organlzaclonal 
S C , - , d m C  to a pr01ect matrlx syscern that 1s deslgned to maxlmlze Corporat;on 
efflclency and p r o ~ e c t  monltorrng. 
Although SFC is seeking to implement efficiently Title I of the Energy 
Security Act, it is unlikely that the Corporation will be able to carry out 
effectively many of the various goals and objectives of this law. Under its 
first four or five solicitations, SFC is expected to commit most, if not all, 
of its appropriated funds, which total roughly $15 billion. With these 
monies, SFC might fund about 8 to 12 projects, including both small and large 
scale efforts. (In light of the Reagan Administration's policy to request no 
additional funds for the Corporation and the current budgetary situation, it 
seems that SFC's program will be limited to its currently appropriated funds, 
unless there are major changes in national policies affecting synfuels 
commercialization. Therefore, SFC may be stimulating a much smaller synfuels 
industry than was envisioned in the Energy Security Act. In fact, if a daily 
synfuels production level of 30,000 to 60,000 barrels of oil equivalent is 
reached by 1987, industry and SFC would have acnieved a major technological 
and economic accomplishment. With this size of an industrial base, there is 
little chance of meeting the Act's goal of having the capacity to produce 2 
million barrels of synfuels per day by 1992. Consequently, S F C 7 s  current 
pro7sain is likely to be ineffective in stimulating the growth of a synfuels 
indxstry capa3ls of "improving the Nation's balance of paymentsw or "reducing 
the threat of economic disruptions from oil supply interruptions" in the 
near-term. Another 10 to 20 years is likely to be required before the U.S. 
synfuels industry will be able to contribute significantly to either of these 
broad goals embodied in the Energy Security Act. 
Instead of implementing a crash program, SFC has decided to proceed 
cautiously with the funding of projects that are designed to advance a wide 
diversity of synfuels processes. For those projects receiving SFC 
assistance, another five to seven years are likely to be required to reach 
full production and to collect reliable information on these operations. As 
a result of this lead time, it may well be into the 1990s before many other 
ccmpanies start investing in new synfuels plants. Thus, the SFC program, a s  
it is now unfolding, is making only limited progress towards assuring "the 
flow of capital funds to those sectors of the national economy which are 
important to the domestic production of synthetic fuels." 
On the other hand, the SFC may be maximizing the use of the $14 to $15 
billion appropriated for its program by assisting only the strongest and 
maturest projects. By assisting in the commercialization of a few successful 
synfuels projects, the SFC may aid the synfuels industry more effectively 
than if a less selective program which assumed greater risks had been 
implemented. By carrying out its solicitation process on a specific 
timetable, determining in advance the sums to be spent on different synfuels 
technologies, quickly eliminating weak and immature projects from 
competition, and expediting its negotiation process, SFC is beginning to 
demonstrate to the private sector its commitment to aid the emerging synfuels 
industry. 
Policy Options Regarding the Future of the SFC 
Congress and the Administration can choose from a variety of options 
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regarding the fiture of the S T ,  inclcdlng: (1) aSollsh the Corporation (see 
ieglslacive sectlon, e-g., S .  250), ( 2 )  extend src's authority to include t r . e  
S . , m -  U,,crz of blonass fuels pro;ects asd energy from s o l ~ e  waste plants, and (3) 
:rcv:de aed~tlcnal appi?cpr:at:or.s beyond =he $14.9 billion now avaliable to 
tne corporation. Some of  he possrble advantages and disadvantages of each 
of these optlons are discussed Selow. 
Abolish SFC 
If the SFC were abolished, there is the possibility, but not the 
guarantee, sf substantial near-term budgetary savings, assuming uncommitted 
funds are not used for other purposes. The actual costs of SFC's progFam 
will depend upon the success of the projects it supports as well as the terms 
of any contracts signed by the Corporation. Thus, if a SFC-supported project 
defaults on a loan guarantee or requires a substantial price support, the 
public treasury would have to outlay funds to cover SFC's obligation. 
Although it is too premature to predict the probability of any outlays, one 
can estimate that the range of possible outlays might be between a total of 
$4 and $6 billion for the FY85 through FY90 budgets. Those who want to 
abolish STC can also argue that it is no longer needed because the U.S. 
energy supply demand situation has become much more favorable and that 
SFC-supported projects would prove to be economically unfeasible or 
snvironmentally unacceptable. 
Those supporting SFC can argue that its program is still essential to the 
Nation's long-term economic stability and national security and that this 
Nation cannot afford to have synfuels investors delay or terminate their 
projects if SFC support were eliminated. They can point out that without SPC 
this Nation would have little of the technical infrastructure to construct a 
viable synfuels industry, and that abolishment of SFC could also reduce or 
delay any downward pressure that synfuels might place on the price of OPEC 
oil. 
The Reagan Administration wants to continue SFC's program at current 
fundinc levels, although this policy is under review by the Presidential 
Cabinet Council on Natural Resources. 
Extending SFC's Authority 
With the authority to support biomass fuels projects or energy from solid 
wast'e plants (ESW), SFC would have a much wider range of synfuels resources 
to choose from. With SFC backing, many ESW and gasohol projects that are 
still in the initial planning stages would likely move forward. SFC' s 
political constituency would also be expanded and the prospects for achieving 
additional near-term synfuels production increased. However, this extension 
of responsibilities could diffuse SFC's senior management capabilities, 
result in additional budgetary outlays, and leave less funds available to 
support SFC's major activities in coal liquefaction and oil shale 
commercialization. 
Additional Appropriations for SFC 
With additional appropriations, SFC could fund a variety of new synfuels 
projects that eventually might help this Nation reach the National Synfuels 
Production Goals contained in P.L. 96-294. These additional funds could be 
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used to contlnue development of the rnfrastrucrure of experienced people, 
know-how, and manufacturing capablllty needed to ensure a successful synfuels 
~ndcstry. A large-scale lndustry brollght zbout wlth SFC support would 
~ r 3 v - e e  th e  Unlked Staces w ~ t 3  a suSstant~ally proved posltion to deal wlth 
- - - n  
UYL, prlclng pollcies as well as orner dislocations caused ~y dlsruprlons of 
lmported 011 supplies. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that any additional Federal funds 
spent on S F C f s  program might be better used for other purposes, e.g., for 
social programs or for energy conservation measures, and that additional 
Federal guarantees administered by SFC might create distortions in the credit 
market. Furthermore, some maintain that the funds already appropriated to 
SFC should be adequate to stimulate the initial growth of a domestic synfuels 
industry and that all future risks should be assumed by the private sector. 
Development of Synfuels Under Amendments to the Defense Production Act of - -
19 5 0 
In creating SFC, Congress recognized that some indeterminate period of 
time would be required before SFC could become operational. Given this lead 
time and the congressional mandate to expedite the production of synfuels for 
national defense purposes, P.L. 96-294 provided the President with several 
new authorities which are specified in the form of amendments to the Defense 
Production Act of 1950. 
Before SFC became operational, the President had authority to offer 
(through the Department of Defense and other Federal agencies) purchase 
agreements, loans, and loan guarantees to stimulate synfuels development for 
national defense needs. Up to $ 3  billion, subject to appropriations, was 
~ a d e  available for this purpose. Once SFC was declared operational by the 
President in February 1982, these authorities were converted to a standby 
basis. 
Prior to the SFC becoming operational, DOE issued solicitations.under the 
Defense Production Act (DPA) amendments of P.L. 96-294, inviting interested 
parties to submit proposals for financial assistance to expedite the 
commercial production of synfuels fcr national defense needs. 
Under the DPA program, DOE awarded a $1.1 billion loan guarantee to TOSCO 
to help build the Colony oil shale plant and $400 million in price supports 
to encourage Union Oil Co. to produce shale oil for use by the DOD. In 
February 1982, SFC accepted the responsibility for overseeing the management 
of the Federal financial assistance for these projects. SFC has since 
terminated the loan guarantee to TOSCO because the Colony project has been 
suspended. 
OTHER FEDERAL ASSISTANCE FOR SYNFUZLS COMMERCIALIZATION 
In addition to P.L. 96-294, the Congress passed several other laws 
designed to promote the commercialization of synfuels projects. Among these 
are P.L. 96-126 and P.L. 96-304, which appropriated funds for DOE'S 
Alternative Fuels Production Program. This program allowed DOE to provide 
fun.ds to encourage industry groups to conduct project feasibility studies, to 
enter into cooperative agreements, to receive loan and price guarantees, as- 
well as to receive purchase commitments for their synfuels products. Using 
its aut'horities under this program, as well as those under the DPA, DOE was 
the major Federal agency promoting the commerclallzatlon of synfuels prolects 
1 SFC became operat~onai. Under the Alternative Fuels Production 
?r=gr&?, 335 c3npleted the ~ s s u s n c e  of more t 9 a r  1 C C  awards for feaslblllzy 
s z - 2 : ~ s  a-Z cc3perat;-~e agree~>ents. In a5e.lr~cn, 295 also awarded a $2 
- - ~l,~:on lsan guarantee co a consort~urn neaaed Sy the Amerlcan Natural 
Resources Co. to build a high-Btu coal gaslflcatlon plant. 
The Reagan Administration does not intend for the DOE to provide any 
additional funds to help commercialize synfuels plants beyond the approximate 
$3.6 billion that have already been committed under the DPA and the 
Alternative Fuels Production programs. Consistent with this policy, P.L. 
97-12 rescinded $300 million previously appropriated under P.L. 96-304 for 
the support of preliminary alternative fuels commercialization activities. 
OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S ENERGY POLICIES AND 
THEIR RELATIONSRIP TO THE FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR SYNFUELS COMMERCIALIZATION 
In the National Energy Policy Plan I11 submitted to Congress in July 1981, 
the Reagan Administration outlined a variety of policies and objectives that 
if implemented successfully could aid synfuels commercialization. An 
important objective of the plan is "to establish sound, stable public 
policies that will encourage individuals and groups in the private and public 
sector to produce and use energy resources wisely and efficiently." The 
Reagan Administration wants to inventory the Federal lands and waters to 
determine the quantities of energy resources so that wise resource decisions 
can be made. In addition, the ReagaR Administration's action t.o end oil 
price controls has provided additional capital for the petroleum industry. 
Some of this capital could be funneled into synfuels projects. Accelerated 
depreciation schedules, which were strongly supported by the Reagan 
Adninistration and enacted as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 
could also spur new investments in synfuels projects. If these policies work 
as projected by the Reagan Admicistration, a business environment could be 
created over the long-term that will promote more investment in synfuels 
projects than is forthcoming at present. 
The Administration has restructured those aspects of the National Synfuels 
Production Program pertaining to the demonstration of new synfuels 
technologies. It wants .to terminate direct DOE funding for synfuels 
demonstration projects. As evidenced by rescissions and deferrals contained 
in P.L. 97-12, the Congress has largely agreed with the Administration's 
position. Under its new policies, DOE will fund long-term, high risk 
research and development projects that industry would not be in a position to 
finance. 
Thus far, the Xeagan Administration has not proposed that the SFC be 
abolished or that its appropriations be reduced. The Administration hopes 
that responsiblity for commercializing synfuels technolog.ies will shift to 
the private sector, with potential support from the SFC. However, when and 
if the private sector will make substantial financial commitments of its own 
funds to construct a large number of synfuels projects remain uncertain. 
It is premature to assess the eventual outcome of these policies on the 
'growth of the synfuels industry. However, to date the Federal Government has 
only made limited progress towards implementing the large-scale programs of 
public support for synfuels commercialization that were enacted by the 96th 
Congress. The fast tract program envisioned under the Defense Production Act 
Amendments of P.L. 96-294 resulted in the issuance of only two financial 
awards to encourage synfuels comrnerclalizatlon. DOE'S loan guarantee 
authority under the F,ederal Non-Nuclear Energy Research and Development Act 
has only recently Seen u t l l ~ z e d - t o  aid. cr.e large scale synfuels pro~ect. 
: ~ p l e m e n ~ a t ~ o n  of SFZ's pragram Pas seen delayed ~y a charge ln 
AZnlnistration as weil as the Clme consuming process of installing a new 
Chalrman and Board of Directors of the SFC. In addltlon, $300 mllllon of 
financial awards under P.L. 96-304, which were designed to expedite 
pre-commerc~alization activities, have been rescinded. 
With respect to industry's involvement, only a small number of private 
corporations have committed substantial amounts of their own capital to 
commercialize synfuels projects. Industry still faces the potential for 
major delays and increased project costs caused by lawsuits and uncertainties 
regarding environmental re.gu1ation.s and other governmental policies. In 
fact, over the last year'about eight major synfuels projects have suspended 
or delayed their commercialization efforts, and SFC has rejected numerous 
projects from its solicitation process. Based on SFC's and industry's 
progress to date, it appears that the prospects for meeting the National 
Synfuels Production G.oals have diminished substantially. 
Additional information on two of the major synthetic fuels technologies 
that will be affected by DOE and SEC programs is provided in the following 
CRS issue briefs: 
IB 74060 -- Oil Shale Development: Outlook, Current Activities 
and Constraints 
IB 77105 -- Coal Gasification and Liquefaction 
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U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. 
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U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. 
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U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. 148 p. (97th Congress, 
1st session. House. Report no. 97-123) 
U.S. Congress. Jolnt Economic Committee. Pursulng energy 
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
01/20/83 -- SFC issued a targeted solicitation for western oil shale 
projects. 
01/10/83 -- SFC received 46 proposals for synfuels projects under its 
third solicitation. 
08/16/82 -- U.S. Senate confirmed the nominations of John Carter 
and Mike Masson to SFC's Board of Directors. 
01/04/82 -- Opening of SFC's second solicitation.for proposals 
from industrial projects seeking SFC support. 
applications will be received until Nay 31, 1982. 
0 7  and 08/81 -- As authorized under the Federal Non-Nuclear 
Research and Development Act and the amendments 
to the Defense Production Act, the DOE provided 
loan guarantees and purchase commitments to a variety 
of companies to spur the commercialization of 
synfuels projects. 
05/28/81 -- House Committee on Government Operations issued its 
report entitled "Oversight of the Energy Security 
Act: Implementation of the Synthetic Fuels Corporation." 
05/14/81 -- Edward Noble was confirmed as Chairman of the the SFC 
by the U.S. Senate. 
04/01/81 - - John McAtee, Jr., Acting Chairman of the SFC, arinounced 
that 51 proposals for .financial assistance were 
received by the Corporation. 
ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES 
ESCOE (The Engineering Societies Commission on Energy, Inc.). 
Synthetic fuels summary. Prepared for the U.S. Department 
of Energy. March 1981. 147 p. (Publ. no. FE-2458-82-A) 
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. 
Synthetic fuels commercialization. In Congressional 
Research Service Review, January 1981, pp. 16-19. 
----- Challenges facing the U.S. synfuels industry and the status of 
- o u r  national synfuels policy. Speech given a t  CRS seminar by 
Paul Rothberg. Feb. 3 ,  1982. 10 p. 
